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*Incl. Estimate*

12 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. COLBY

SUBJECT: Draft Letter (DCI to D/DIA) on Military Intelligence

I find this draft deeply troubling. By implication at least it goes a fair way to compromise the present national intelligence system. It could only tend to diminish the authority of the DCI in the production of national intelligence on military subjects.

It was my understanding that the discussion in the DCI's meeting yesterday had a different outcome: D/DIA was to be told, either orally or by letter, that his proposed footnote to 13-8-73 was inadmissible on the ground that it appeared to claim that a DIA document, i.e., a departmental product, could be used as national intelligence or substituted for the NIE. (This is not a "theoretical" debating point but goes to the heart of the system and the DCI's role in it.) I attach an alternative draft of a letter to de Poix.

Following are comments on some particular statements made in your draft letter:

1) "DIA's mission is military intelligence and the DCI should and does rely heavily upon DIA on this subject." --The DIA mission is not confined to military intelligence. DIA works on a variety of non-military subjects and participates in all aspects of national intelligence production through the NIE system. Its representatives speak on any and all subjects in O/NE's coordination meetings as does its Director at the USIB table. Any listing of DIA's own publications confirms that it does not limit itself to military intelligence.

The quote above also implies a primacy for DIA in military intelligence. In fact, the DCI relies on all the

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analytical resources of the Community in producing national intelligence on military subjects. And he is well advised to do so, even if it were not a constitutional point, because national intelligence on "military" topics is not purely military in character; it necessarily gives weight to other considerations - political, economic, psychological, etc. Hence on any "military" subject evoking national policy interest, departments other than the military ones must be effectively involved.

2) It is true that in NSCID No. 3 there is reference to "a general delineation of primary responsibilities" and that military intelligence is assigned to the Department of Defense. It is also stated, however, that CIA "may produce such other intelligence as may be necessary to discharge the statutory responsibilities of the DCI." These include production of national intelligence.

What has in fact happened over the last dozen years is that under this latter clause CIA has acquired analytical resources to deal with military intelligence at the national level. We in O/NE can testify on the basis of more than twenty years of experience in coordinating NIE's with the agencies that the DCI could not have met his responsibilities without these resources or had he rested on the "primary production responsibility" of DIA. That remains true today. The quality of analytical effort and the commitment to objectivity in DIA and other military agencies are not such as to permit a DCI to rely "heavily" upon them in producing national intelligence.

For this reason, it would be unwise for a DCI to state in writing at this time that CIA's role will be only to provide the DCI with a "minimum review" capability, implying that he concedes DIA's right to primacy in the field. There is no way to do a "minimum" review. A capability in non-military agencies to engage seriously on such subjects, insofar as they are treated

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at national intelligence level, is essential if the system is to work effectively. Further, in the OMB study on the Intelligence Community which led to the Presidential directive of 5 November 71, it was emphatically stressed that national intelligence product should issue from the interaction of competitive centers of analysis lodged in the various departments. Part of the purpose of that study was to upgrade the competence of all such centers to participate fully in the process. This does not mean, of course, that measures are not required to limit excessive duplication in publication by these various centers.

3) "Joint task forces of DIA and CIA personnel...to study particular subjects on the working level" would not, in practice, resolve any really important issues "on a substantive rather than institutional basis." Such task forces would serve to compound bureaucratic confusion since the issues considered would concern others than CIA and DIA. Working groups with appropriately wider membership already exist in representatives meetings on NIEs and in USIB committees. There are also multiple informal working level contacts -- especially between CIA and DIA -- and ad hoc study groups have done some good in cases where the issues involved have not been significant. But institutional special interest is a reality, and when major differences on matters of consequence are at stake, individuals in any working group will speak for their organizational interest. O/NE's system of community coordination is precisely designed in recognition of this fact; it is the DCI's instrument for assuring that all the special points of view get a fair hearing, and that the issues are resolved to the extent possible on a substantive plane.

4) "A clear-cut procedure be developed for CIA to review the bases for the conclusions in DIA's estimates and projections." -- This is incomprehensible to me. DIA's estimates, insofar as they are departmental issuances, could not properly be reviewed by CIA. Insofar as DIA contributes estimative views for consideration in national intelligence issuances, the machinery for community coordination operated by O/NE for the DCI already provides a "clear-cut procedure."

  
JOHN HUIZENGA  
Director  
National Estimates

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ATTACHMENT

12 June 1973

Draft Letter: DCI to D/DIA

I am informed that when the USIB under chairmanship of General Walters on 7 June 1973 considered NIE 13-8-73 you submitted a proposed dissent stating that "the Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning (DIPP) already provides representative Chinese force options suitable for national planning purposes."

I find that such a footnote is inappropriate and I am issuing the Estimate without it. I cannot publish in an NIE, a document for which the DCI bears sole final responsibility, an implied claim that a departmental document should be substituted for a national intelligence document. Such a claim strikes at the core of the DCI's defined responsibilities as the Intelligence Advisor to the President and the NSC. There cannot be separate or alternative sources of national intelligence; such intelligence must emanate from the DCI. These principles are clearly set forth in the National Security Act of 1947 and most recently in the President's letter of November 5, 1971, and are reflected in the advisory, but non-voting role of USIB.

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
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Lying beneath the surface of the discussion over the Force Projections and the proposed DIA footnote is, of course, the whole matter of how national intelligence on military subjects is produced and what DIA's role is. I propose to discuss this in the next USIB meeting and hope that you will express your views freely on that occasion.

Let me say now that any DCI must be concerned that DIA's competence in this field continue to be developed, strengthened, and achieve optimum effectiveness, both in its departmental role and as participant in the national intelligence process. The upgrading of the competence of "competitive centers of analysis" was stressed in the Presidential directive of 5 November 1971 and this is a matter requiring our best efforts.

But the DCI cannot accept any claim to "primacy" in any subject area of national intelligence which would restrict his right to determine the format, content, or substance of National Estimates.

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D R A F T  
WEC:blp (11 June 1973)

Vice Admiral Vincent P. de Poix  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Vince:

Our discussion over the footnote in NIE 13-8-73 (China's Strategic Attack Programs) raises the question of the proper relationship between DIA and CIA on military intelligence. As you know, this has also been raised in Congress and in the press as a fallout from Danny Graham's article in Army magazine. In this letter I would like to set out a few principles and then suggest some possible actions to resolve this whole subject.

The first principle, of course, is the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence to the National Security Council. This requires that he state his view of any national security problem, a principle clearly enunciated in the advisory but nonvoting role of USIB and its membership enunciated in the President's letter of November 5, 1971. The corollary of this principle is that the DCI must satisfy himself of the accuracy of any Estimate or statement made to the National Security Council, and he must be totally free in the means he takes to do this.

Obviously, DIA's mission is military intelligence, and the DCI should and does rely heavily upon DIA on this subject. In order to carry

out the responsibility mentioned above, however, it is necessary that the DCI have a capability for independent review and assessment of the accuracy of the conclusions <sup>submitted to him</sup> reached by DIA. It is on this basis that <sup>developed</sup> CIA has a capability in the military intelligence field and that this capability must be maintained.

The degree and depth of CIA involvement in military intelligence will stem directly from the degree to which the DCI's needs are supplied by DIA with <sup>in</sup> maximum CIA review or, on the other hand, <sup>by the degree</sup> that this review must be extensive and even involve a considerable degree of independent work. In this context, I am most interested in strengthening the DIA contribution and profiting to the maximum <sup>from</sup> its capability. Aside from the value this might have to the Defense Department and the JCS, it would also permit a lesser rather than greater allocation of CIA resources to this subject. The following courses of action seem appropriate to move in this direction:

- a. That ~~the~~ DCI and his Intelligence Community Staff review with DIA measures which might be taken to strengthen DIA's capability in terms of personnel, procedures, etc.
- b. That, <sup>to</sup> to the degree feasible, joint task forces of DIA and CIA personnel be established to study particular subjects on the working level so that differences can be discussed and resolved on a substantive rather than institutional basis.

c. That <sup>the</sup> a clear-cut procedure be developed for CIA to review the bases for conclusions of DIA's estimates and projections rather ~~than developing independent ones.~~

I would like to discuss this further with you with a view to establishing a joint study group, possibly chaired by General Walters, to examine the matter in greater detail and come up with specific action recommendations, rather than allowing the subject of military intelligence responsibility to be debated in somewhat theoretical terms and become a greater issue than it need be.

Sincerely,

James R. Schlesinger  
Director